

HEALTH SECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL

Joint Cybersecurity Working Group

CYBERSECURITY IN THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR

*for the Confidentiality Coalition of the
Healthcare Leadership Council*

Briefing
July 15, 2021

Greg Garcia
Executive Director



Critical Infrastructure

Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the[ir] incapacitation or destruction ... would have a debilitating impact on security, ... economic security, ... public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

§1016(e) of the USA Patriot Act of 2001
(42 U.S.C. §5195c(e))



Figure 2 Health Care Ecosystem

Laboratories, Blood & Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Drug Store Chains
Pharmacists' Associations
Public and Private Laboratory Associations
Blood Banks

Medical Materials

Medical Equipment & Supply
Manufacturing & Distribution
Medical Device Manufacturers

Health Information Technology

Medical Research Institutions
Information Standards Bodies
Electronic Medical Record System and Other Clinical Medical System Vendors

Federal Response & Program Offices

Coordinated Response Activities
Under Emergency Support Function 8
Government Coordinating Council
Federal Partners (e.g., HHS, DoD, other sector partners)

Direct Patient Care

Healthcare Systems
Professional Associations
Medical Facilities
Emergency Medical Services
Consumer Devices \ BYOD

Mass Fatality Management Services


Cemetery, Cremation, Morgue, and Funeral Homes
Mass Fatality Support Services (e.g., coroners, medical examiners, forensic examiners, & psychological support personnel)

Health Plans and Payers


Health Insurance Companies & Plans
Local and State Health Departments
State Emergency Health Organizations

Public Health

Governmental Public Health Services
Public Health Networks



The Healthcare Ecosystem – Connected, Digitized and Portable



A Snapshot of Healthcare Cyber Attacks in 2020



- 599 HEALTHCARE BREACHES – 55% INCREASE OVER 2019
- HACKING AND IT INCIDENTS CONSTITUTED 93% OF HEALTHCARE BREACHES
- THE AVERAGE COST PER BREACHED RECORD INCREASED FROM \$429 IN 2019 TO \$500 IN 2020
- THE AVERAGE HEALTHCARE FIRM TOOK ABOUT 236 DAYS TO RECOVER FROM AN ATTACK
- 1M HEALTHCARE RECORDS BREACHED EACH MONTH LAST YEAR



Another banner year for cybercriminals




Healthcare Data Breaches in 2020




- TOP EIGHT BREACHES REPORTED TO HHS INVOLVED 500,000 RECORDS OR MORE
 - OVER 6.5 MILLION RECORDS TOTAL WERE REPORTED
- 75% OF ALL RECORDS EXPOSED IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2020 WERE DUE TO COMPROMISED BUSINESS ASSOCIATES.
- SPECIFIC TYPES OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS TARGETED:
 - HOSPITAL SYSTEMS
 - LIFE SCIENCE LABS
 - RESEARCH LABS
 - REHABILITATION FACILITIES
 - GENERIC HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE 26 MILLION RECORDS BREACHED IN 2020, 93% WERE ATTRIBUTED TO MALICIOUS HACKING INCIDENTS, RATHER THAN OTHER CAUSES SUCH AS UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE, IMPROPER DISPOSAL, THEFT OR LOSS.



Healthcare Data Breaches and Other Sectors



HHS “Wall of Shame”

Welcome | File a Breach | HHS | Office for Civil Rights | Contact Us

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Office for Civil Rights

Breach Portal: Notice to the Secretary of HHS Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information

Under Investigation

Archive

Help for Consumers

As required by section 13402(e)(4) of the HITECH Act, the Secretary must post a list of breaches of unsecured protected health information affecting 500 or more individuals. The following breaches have been reported to the Secretary:

Cases Currently Under Investigation

This page lists all breaches reported within the last 24 months that are currently under investigation by the Office for Civil Rights.

[Show Advanced Options](#)

Breach Report Results							
Expand All	Name of Covered Entity ▾	State ▾	Covered Entity Type ▾	Individuals Affected ▾	Breach Submission Date ▾	Type of Breach	Location of Breached Information
1	New Bedford Jewish Convalescent Home, Inc.	MA	Healthcare Provider	873	03/02/2021	Hacking/IT Incident	Network Server
1	ProComp Software Consultants, Inc.	OH	Business Associate	1008	03/02/2021	Hacking/IT Incident	Network Server
1	Geisinger Health Plan	PA	Health Plan	2872	02/28/2021	Unauthorized Access/Disclosure	Paper/Films
1	The SurgiCare Center of Utah	UT	Healthcare Provider	8675	02/26/2021	Hacking/IT Incident	Network Server
1	AllyAlign Health, Inc.	VA	Health Plan	33932	02/26/2021	Hacking/IT Incident	Network Server
1	Cornerstone Care, Inc.	PA	Healthcare Provider	11487	02/25/2021	Hacking/IT Incident	Email
1	BW Homecare Holdings, LLC, in its capacity as the parent corporation of the Elara Caring single affiliated covered entity	TX	Healthcare Provider	100487	02/24/2021	Hacking/IT Incident	Email
1	Campbell County Hospital District	WY	Healthcare Provider	900	02/24/2021	Unauthorized Access/Disclosure	Email
1	Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Northern California	CA	Healthcare Provider	24134	02/23/2021	Unauthorized Access/Disclosure	Electronic Medical Record

... AND ALMOST 600 MORE



- 560 HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS IMPACTED BY RANSOMWARE – **MORE THAN 1 PER DAY**
- CLINICAL WORKFLOW DISRUPTED
- PAYMENT SYSTEMS DOWN
- AMBULANCES REROUTED
- RADIATION TREATMENTS FOR CANCER PATIENTS DELAYED
- MEDICAL RECORDS INACCESSIBLE AND SOME PERMANENTLY LOST
- HUNDREDS OF STAFF FURLOUGHED
- PHI AND OTHER SENSITIVE DATA STOLEN AND PUBLISHED ONLINE

RESULTING RANSOMWARE RISK:

PATIENT HARM


LOSS OF QUALITY OF CARE

INCREASED BURN RATE

REDUCED OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY



Healthcare Ransomware and Other Sectors



Source: <https://www.coveware.com/blog/ransomware-marketplace-report-q4-2020>

Ransomware Attack Method



2020-21 OCR BREACH ACTION

ENTITY	WHEN	BREACH	IMPACT (# PEOPLE)	PENALTY (\$M)
EXCELLUS HEALTH PLAN	JANUARY 2021	HACKED IT SYSTEM	9.3 MILLION	\$5.1m
PREMERA	SEPTEMBER 2020	HACKED IT SYSTEM	10.4 MILLION	\$6.85m
LIFESPAN HEALTH SYSTEM	JULY 2020	THEFT OF UNENCRYPTED LAPTOP		\$1.04m

BREACHES UNDER OCR INVESTIGATION – 3/2020 – 3/2021: 522

BREACHES UNDER OCR INVESTIGATION IN MARYLAND: 15 – SAMPLES BELOW

ENTITY	WHEN	BREACH	IMPACT (# PEOPLE)	PENALTY (\$M)
MEDSTAR HEALTH	9/25/2020	HACKED NETWORK SERVER	668	TBD
ADVENTIST HEALTH	9/11/2020	HACKED NETWORK SERVER	13,041	TBD
UNIVERSITY MARYLAND	7/24/2020	HACKED EMAIL	33,896	TBD
KAISER PERMANENTE	5/22/2020	UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS EMR	2756	TBD
MAGELLAN HEALTH MAGELLAN PHARMACY MAGELLAN IMAGING	6/12/20	HACKED EMAIL	50,410 33,040 22,560	TBD

Medical Device Risks

A patient bed has an average of 15 medical devices.
A 500 bed hospital could have **7,500 devices** . Most of them **connect to the network**.

- Most hospitals have ‘networked’ medical devices over 8-10 years old.
- The security-related components in these devices pose a cyber risk
 - The operating systems & microcontrollers no longer receive maintenance or security patches from the component vendor. i.e “Not Supported by Vendor”
 - Often have common passwords set by the manufacturer that cannot be changed.
 - Often have unencrypted hard drives
- Time and cost to update these devices is very expensive

Medical Device Security and Management Must be Balanced

Balance between weak security... that could, for example, allow malicious modification of the operation of an implanted cardiac device and...

Restrictive security ... that could, for example, prevent medical personnel from accessing an implanted cardiac device without restrictions



Healthcare's Changing Risk Priorities



From “Business Critical” over “Mission Critical” to “Life Critical”

Confidentiality

- Sensitive Patient Data
- But also PII & PCI
- Account Information
- Billing & Payment Data
- Intellectual Property
 - Clinical Trials
 - Research
 - Designs & Formularies
- Legal & HR Documents
- Identities & Credentials

Availability

- Clinical Systems
 - Electronic Records & Specialty
 - Ancillary (PACS, Lab, Pharma)
 - ePrescription / EPCS
- Medical Devices
 - Availability of clinical services and diagnostic results
- Business Systems
 - eMail
 - Financial Systems (e.g. billing)
 - Scheduling, ERP, etc.

Integrity

- Critical Patient Data
 - Medication (prescriptions and dosages)
 - Allergies and History
 - Diagnosis and Therapy
 - Alarms (clinical & technical)
- Critical Technical Data
 - Calibration
 - Safety Limits
- Functionality & reliability
 - Risk of patient harm

← Patient and Staff Experience: “Trust Zone” →

← Risk of Harm: “Patient Safety Zone” →

HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE

June 2017

HEALTHCARE CYBERSECURITY IS IN CRITICAL CONDITION

Severe Lack of Security Talent

The majority of health delivery orgs lack full-time, qualified security personnel

Legacy Equipment

Equipment is running on old, unsupported, and vulnerable operating systems.

Premature/Over-Connectivity

"Meaningful Use" requirements drove hyper-connectivity without secure design & implementation.

Vulnerabilities Impact Patient Care

One security compromise shut down patient care at Hollywood Presbyterian and UK Hospitals

Known Vulnerabilities Epidemic

One legacy, medical technology had over 1,400 vulnerabilities



Prescription for Cyber Health

2017 Health Care Industry Cybersecurity (HCIC) Task Force – Six Imperatives and 105 Action Items

1. Define and streamline leadership, governance, and expectations for healthcare industry cybersecurity.
2. Increase the security and resilience of medical devices and health IT
3. Develop the healthcare workforce capacity necessary to prioritize and ensure cybersecurity awareness and technical capabilities
4. Increase healthcare industry readiness through improved cybersecurity awareness and education
5. Identify mechanisms to protect R&D efforts and intellectual property from attacks and exposure
6. Improve information sharing of industry threats, risks, and mitigations

How the Health Sector Collaborates to Addresses HCIC Recommendations

Health Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC)

- The cross-sector coordinating body representing one of 16 critical infrastructure sectors organized under Presidential Executive Order ([PPD-21](#))
- As a “Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council”, exempted from Federal Advisory Committee Act requirements to protect ongoing sensitive deliberations with government
- A trust-community partnership convening companies, non-profits and industry associations across six subsectors
- ***Mission: to identify cyber and physical risks to the security and resiliency of the sector, and develop planning guidance in a 3-year [Sector Specific Plan](#) and implementing task groups for mitigating those risks***
- Focused on longer-term critical infrastructure policy and strategy, complementing the operational Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center

HSCC Joint Cybersecurity Working Group

- Largest standing Working Group under the HSCC umbrella
- Identifies and develops strategic, cross-sector solutions to cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities affecting the security and resiliency of the healthcare sector
- 277 voting industry member organizations, which includes 42 industry associations and professional societies across the 6 health subsectors;
- 15 federal, state, local and Canadian government agencies;
- 45 non-voting SME Advisors, and 657 total member-organization personnel
- 12 outcome-oriented task groups meet regularly through the year; Full CWG meets twice a year around the country
- Works closely on joint initiatives with:
 - HHS offices of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
 - Chief Information Officer
 - FDA


HEALTH SECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL JOINT CYBERSECURITY WORKING GROUP

Organizational Membership Subsector Distribution

- Direct Patient Care: **39.1%**
- Health Information Technology: **10.0%**
- Health Plans and Payers: **3.9%**
- Mass fatality and Management Services: **0**
- Medical Materials: **10.8%**
- Laboratories, Blood, Pharmaceuticals: **4.7%**
- Public Health: **3.6%**
- Cross-sector: **8.6%**
- Government (Fed, State, County, Local): **10.5%**
- Non-Voting Advisors: **12.5%**

Governance

Cybersecurity Working Group Structure



2021 Executive Committee



CHAIR: Terence (Terry) Rice
Vice President, Information
Risk Management and CISO,
Merck. End of Term: Dec. 2021



VICE CHAIR: Theresa Meadows,
SVP & CIO, Cook Children's
Healthcare System. End of
Term: Dec. 2021



Erik Decker, AVP - Chief
Information Security Officer
Intermountain Healthcare
End of Term: Dec. 2021



Leslie A. Saxon, MD,
Executive Director, USC
Center for Body
Computing. End of Term:
Dec. 2023



Marilyn Zigmund Luke, Vice
President, Special Projects
America's Health Insurance Plans.
End of Term: Dec. 2022



Michael McNeil,
Senior Vice President,
Global CISO,
McKesson. End of
Term: Dec. 2022



Greg Barnes, CISO
Amgen. End of Term:
Dec. 2021



Sri Bharadwaj, Vice President,
Digital Innovation,
Franciscan Health. End of
Term: Dec. 2021



Denise Anderson,
President, Health-ISAC. End
of Term: Dec. 2021



Mark Jarrett, Chief Quality Officer,
Senior Vice President & Associate
Chief Medical Officer, Northwell
Health. End of Term: Dec. 2022

JOINT CYBERSECURITY WORKING GROUP GOVERNMENT CO-CHAIRS

Suzanne Schwartz

Director

Office of Strategic Partnerships & Technology Innovation (OST)
Center for Devices and Radiological Health
U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Bob Bastani

Senior Cyber Security Advisor

Security, Intel, and Information Management Division
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness & Response
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Julie Chua

Director, Governance, Risk, Compliance (GRC)
HHS Office of the Chief Information Officer

Objectives – Implementing the HCIC Recommendations

Task Group Status as of June 2021

- **405(d) – HEALTH INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES**
 - Released HICP Wave 1 Supplements (Quick Start and Matrix); continuing with Wave 2 and 3 supplements development
- **FUTURE GAZING**
 - Preparing White Paper on Artificial Intelligence
- **HEALTH TECHNOLOGY RISK ANALYSIS**
 - Preparing White Paper on Artificial Intelligence
- **IP DATA PROTECTION**
 - Published Health Industry Cybersecurity Protection of Innovation Capital Guide May 2020; to disband after HIC-PIC marketing initiatives
- **INTERNATIONAL**
 - Hosting webinars on health-cyber international coordination
- **LEGACY MEDICAL DEVICES**
 - Ongoing – Publication expected Q2 / late Q1
- **MODEL CONTRACTS**
 - Ongoing – Publication expected Q2
- **VULNERABILITY COMMUNICATIONS**
 - Ongoing - Publication this year
- **POLICY**
 - Activates as needed for policy proposals and response
- **RISK ASSESSMENT**
 - Finalized NIST Cyber Framework Implementation guide; under review by HHS for co-branding
- **SUPPLY CHAIN**
 - Published HIC-SCRiM v2 on September 22; Assessing options for next initiative
- **TELEMEDICINE**
 - Published in April “Health Industry Cybersecurity – Securing Telehealth and Telemedicine (HIC-STAT)”
- **WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT**
 - Preparing series of cybersecurity training videos for clinicians and healthcare students

2019-2021 Guidance Publications

SEE: <https://healthsectorcouncil.org/hsc- recommendations/>

- **June 2021** [Letter to President Biden on Healthcare Cybersecurity Strategy](#)
- **April 2021** [Health Industry Cybersecurity – Securing Telehealth and Telemedicine](#)
- **September 2020** [Health Industry Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management](#)
- **June 2020** [Health Sector Return-to-Work \(R2W\) Guidance](#)
- **May 2020** [Health Industry Cybersecurity Tactical Crisis Response](#)
- **May 2020** [Health Industry Cybersecurity Protection of Innovation Capital](#)
- **March 2020** [Health Industry Cybersecurity Information Sharing Best Practices](#)
- **March 2020** [Management Checklist for Teleworking Surge During COVID-19](#)
- **October 2019** [Health Industry Cybersecurity Matrix of Information Sharing Organizations](#)
- **June 2019** [Health Industry Cybersecurity Workforce Guide](#)
- **January 2019** [Medical Device and Health IT Joint Security Plan \(JSP\)](#)
- **January 2019** [Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices \(HICP\)](#)

Deliverables on Deck

- **Health Industry NIST Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guide – Expected Q3**
- **Legacy Medical Device Cybersecurity Management Guide – Expected Late Q3**
- **Medical Device Model Cybersecurity Contract Language – Expected Late Q3**

2021 Priorities

- **Coordinated incident response protocols**
- **Multi-tier supply chain security**
- **Clarified shared responsibility among MDMs and HDO for cybersecurity**
- **Security preparedness for remote, digital and emerging health technologies**
- **More capable clinical workforce in basic cybersecurity responsibilities**
- **Broad adoption of cyber security practices across provider ecosystem**
- **Structured and reliable partnership with government in healthcare cyber operations and policy**
- **Update 5-year plan of the 2016 Healthcare and Public Health Sector Specific Plan**

Patient Safety Requires Cyber Safety

HEALTH SECTOR COORDINATING COUNCIL

Joint Cybersecurity Working Group

Greg Garcia

Executive Director

Greg.Garcia@HealthSectorCouncil.org

Allison Burke

Program Operations Lead

Allison.Burke@HealthSectorCouncil.org

<https://HealthSectorCouncil.org>